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John Kenneth Knaus, a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) ofﬁcer 
and now a historian at Harvard University, trained a Tibetan guerrilla 
and directed the CIA's covert operations against Chinese aggressors in 
Tibet for seven years beginning in 1958. He wrote about the fascinat-
ing story of the CIA's engagement in Tibet from 1956 and into the early 
1970s in his memoirs, Orphans of the Cold War: America and the Tibetan 
Struggle for Survival (1999). 
 In Beyond Shangri-La: America and Tibet's Move into the Twenty-
First Century, Knaus has accounted what must be to date the most com-
prehensive and detailed history of US–Tibetan relations, starting with 
the 13th Dalai Lama's encounter with a US representative in 1908 and 
culminating with the armed resistance against the Communist Chinese 
50 years later. 
We follow how the Dalai Lama and his representatives met and 
entered into relationships with American emissaries, politicians, ad-
venturers and devotees, and how these individuals inﬂuenced US rela-
tions with the Dalai Lama and Tibet that, according to Knaus, became 
characterized by a rich mix of fortuitous events and a fascinating cast 
of personalities. These players' views about Tibet are revealed in their 
reports, memoirs and communication with peers. Being one of these 
government agents himself, Knaus has also depended upon his own 
ﬁrsthand experiences and has taken advantage of his longtime involve-
ment and friendships with Tibetans and American agents alike. Knaus 
adds details based upon this intimate relationship to the events over 
seven years and to the people who have retold their experiences to him 
in many interviews.
The history ﬁrst unfolds through a string of remarkable meetings 
between individuals who turned out to be decisive to the course of 
US–Tibetan relations. The very ﬁrst meeting that initiated ofﬁcial Ameri-
can–Tibetan contact occurred in 1908 at the historic shrine of Wutais-
han, west of Beijing. There, the ethnographer cum American diplomat 
to China, William Woodville Rockhill, met a dispossessed 13th Dalai 
Lama who (after the 'Younghusband expedition' in 1903–1904 when 
the British had forcibly entered Tibet) had been summoned to Beijing 
by the Manchu ruler. Rockhill assured the 33-year-old Dalai Lama that 
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Tibet had many friends abroad and that America was one of its many 
well-wishers, but advised the Dalai Lama to cooperate and solve Tibet's 
troubles within the Manchu empire. 
After this initial meeting and for the next four decades, Washington 
was the disengaged fence sitter who accepted that the British took the 
lead in dealing with the Dalai Lamas and Tibet. When the British with-
drew following India's independence in 1947, the US got involved and 
became a principal player in Tibetan affairs. The Tibetan capitulation 
in 1951 with the signing of the Seventeen-Point Agreement between 
the 14th Dalai Lama's envoys and the PRC government pushed the US 
into taking a more active stance. President Eisenhower initiated covert 
action as a tool of American foreign policy, and this also became the 
strategy when the US moved its anti-Communist crusade to Tibet. The 
elder brothers of the Dalai Lama, Takster Rinpoche and Gyalo Thondup, 
acted as middlemen, and the latter was instrumental in facilitating US 
involvement that launched a 'legacy of engagement which remains 
today'. Furthermore, with the cooperation of Gyalo Thondup, the CIA 
recruited and trained Tibetan refugees as agents to create a resistance 
network that sabotaged Chinese operations and dropped supplies to 
Tibetan insurgents, organized intelligence networks within Tibet and 
set up a paramilitary unit based in remote Mustang. The CIA's Tibetan 
Task Force arranged arms drops, two of which happened before the 
Dalai Lama left Lhasa in March 1959. Moreover, the CIA assisted the 
Dalai Lama's ﬂight from Tibet and helped him establish a government-
in-exile in India. It also trained and equipped the Special Frontier Force, 
a special unit of Tibetans in the Indian intelligence services.
It is especially this part of US–Tibetan relations—the American's 
direct and active involvement in Tibetan affairs—that I ﬁnd the most 
interesting. Nevertheless, as is obvious from the present reading, such 
active engagement did not characterize the US–Tibetan relationship 
from 1908 until today. The CIA's meddling in Tibetan–Chinese relations 
and covert help is more the exception than the rule. After the CIA aban-
doned its engagement in Tibet, the US subsidy to the Dalai Lama was 
phased out. However, concurrent with the success of the Dalai Lama 
and his representatives in internationalizing the Tibetan cause in the 
1980s, starting with the Dalai Lama's ﬁrst visit to the United States in 
1979, the US Congress established itself as a supporter. Examples of this 
support include passing bills such as the acceptance of one thousand 
Tibetan immigrants to the USA, providing funds for refugee assistance, 
negotiating UN hearings, and nominating the Dalai Lama for the Nobel 
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Peace Prize. Knaus also relates how US support was galvanized with the 
establishment of a Tibet coordinator in the State Department in 1997, and 
how the Dalai Lama was received in the White House by US presidents, 
the ﬁrst time in 1991 by Bush, and more recently, by Obama. 
All of this is captivating reading, but any attempt to characterize US–
Tibetan relations, I believe, should not only relate the behind-the-scenes 
of Washington. Apart from the operational assistance in the struggle 
against Chinese forces in Tibet and the diplomatic assistance that was 
sought in Washington, the Tibetan exile movement has also cooperated 
with the Americans in building a democratic government-in-exile and 
refugee settlements in South Asia. In particular, the lack of information 
about what goes on behind the scenes at the Tibetan government-in-exile 
headquarters in Dharamsala, India, gives the impression that the course 
of US–Tibetan relations is dictated by the Americans. Their stories are 
indeed interesting, but it would be enriching if Knaus had also given a 
more prominent voice to the many Tibetans whom he has personally 
dealt with. The Dalai Lama's brother Gyalo Thondup plays, of course, 
a pivotal role in Knaus' account, but we learn little about his and other 
Tibetans' work in Dharamsala. 
Nevertheless, it is certainly legitimate to focus on the US–Tibetan re-
lationship seen from an American perspective. Although this reader has 
a particular interest in Dharamsala politics, Knaus' book is a welcome 
contribution in that it does not look at the history of Tibet as something 
evolving outside of and isolated from international politics, which 
until not long ago was the preferred narrative in dealing with Tibet. 
Knaus moves beyond Shangri-La, and his book can be recommended to 
anyone who is interested in Tibet's role as both a pawn and a player in 
international politics.
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